ABSTRACT For efficiency improvement and public key size reduction, a new public key compression scheme is proposed for fully homomorphic encryption based on quadratic parameters with correction (QPC-PKC scheme). Compared with existing public key compression schemes, the size of the public key in the proposed scheme is reduced fromÕ(λ 5 ) toÕ(λ 3.5 ) by reducing the number of subgroup public key elements and the element bit-lengths. Based on the construction mechanisms of the somewhat fully homomorphic encryption (SWHE), a QPC-PKC SWHE scheme is constructed and the parameter constraints are presented. The correctness and semantical security of the proposed QPC-PKC SWHE scheme are then proved based on the error-free approximate greatest common divisor assumption. Finally, the public key size performance of the QPC-PKC scheme is theoretically analyzed, while the public key sizes and running times of the QPC-PKC SWHE scheme are experimentally evaluated. The results show that the public key size of the proposed scheme is significantly reduced compared with the existing schemes, and the encryption efficiency of the QPC-PKC SWHE scheme is also improved as expected.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing, multi-party computations and Internet of Things have received significant attention in the information science field, and the security requirement related to these technologies has also become a topic of interest [1] - [5] . Many schemes such as remote data possession checking protocol [6] , outsourced attribute-based encryption schemes [7] , [8] had been proposed to solve the security of outsourced data in the remote cloud servers. A full homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme was proposed to provide security for cloud computing, multi-party computations and Internet of Things.
FHE was originally known as privacy homomorphic encryption, which allows for arbitrarily complex ciphertext operations without decryption [9] . This powerful primitive has a myriad of potential applications such as private cloud computing. Rivest and Adleman first proposed FHE in 1978, and many researches have focused on the related techniques since then. However, none of this research could support the unlimited addition and multiplication operations on the ciphertext without decreasing the accuracy or effectiveness of decryption. The fully FHE function is still unachieved.
Gentry designed the first idealized FHE scheme (the ''Gentry scheme'') [10] . The Gentry scheme uses ideal lattices, complex matrixes and vectors for encryption. However, this scheme cannot be used in practical applications due to the operational complexities and efficiency problems. Smart and Vercauteren [11] improved the Gentry scheme using a shorter key and smaller ciphertext size. Gentry and Havevi [12] developed an optimized FHE scheme in 2011. This scheme shows that 2.3 Gigabyte public keys are used for an FHE function based on ideal lattices. Moreover, 30 minutes are required to run each bootstrapping operation in this scheme.
Dijk et al. [13] proposed a new fully homomorphic encryption scheme, the DGHV scheme, in 2010. This scheme is based on the approximate greatest common divisor (GCD) assumption and uses a simple algebraic structure to simplify the computation. A complexity optimization is obtained, allowing the FHE to be applied in practical application. The DGHV scheme is based on the framework of the Gentry scheme, including the bootstrappable technique, which is used to solve the rapid expansion of the noise component when the ciphertexts are multiplied.
Although the DGHV scheme achieves complexity optimization, it still faces two problems. First, the DGHV scheme public key has aÕ λ 8 size, which is too large for any practical application. Second, the plaintext space is {0, 1}, i.e., only one bit is encrypted at a time, which is extremely inefficient. Some researchers have proposed solutions to these problems, such as the batch technique that can increase the efficiency, while a number of public key compression schemes have been designed to reduce the public key size.
Coron et al. [14] proposed a public key compression scheme with a quadratic form (QF-PKC scheme). The QF-PKC scheme reduced the public key size fromÕ(λ 8 ) tõ O(λ 6.5 ) and maintained security by utilizing a stronger variant of the approximate GCD assumption, which was proven to be secure in [13] . Later, Coron et al. [15] proposed a second public key compression scheme with a correction (C-PKC scheme). It reduced the public key size toÕ(λ 5 ) and remained secure. The C-PKC scheme public key size is 10.1 MB based on the parameter constraint in [15] . This public key is significantly smaller than the 802 MB public key used in the QF-PKC scheme. The huge public key size in these FHE schemes had hindered the application of FHE systems.
None of the discussed schemes can encrypt more than one bit at a time, which hinders the efficiency of the FHE scheme. Cheon et al. [16] optimized the DGHV scheme by introducing a batch processing technology based on the decisional approximate greatest common divisor. Coron et al. [17] presented a fully homomorphic batch encryption scheme based on the assumption of an error-free approximate greatest common divisor. This scheme has a public key size ofÕ(λ 8 ). Moreover, [18] proposes an improved fully homomorphic encryption based on the approximate greatest common divisor, where two plaintext bits are simultaneously encrypted. This scheme has aÕ(λ 7 ) public key size. Batch technology is also used in [19] to optimize the DGHV scheme to allow multiple plaintext bits to be homomorphically encrypted in one ciphertext processing time. This scheme reduced the public key size toÕ(λ 5 ).
Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [20] proposed a new fully homomorphic encryption scheme based on the learning with error (LWE) assumption [21] . In 2012, Brakerski et al. proposed the BGV scheme, which is based on the GLWE assumption. The noise produced by the homomorphic encryption of the BGV scheme is increasingly linear rather than exponential, which improves the efficiency of the FHE scheme. A fully homomorphic encryption scheme with a smaller public key size was presented in [23] . However, this scheme is based on the LWE assumption.
In 2012, Yang et al. proposed a new somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme over integers which claimed that the public key size of somewhat FHE is reduced toÕ(λ 3 ) [24] . However, its security is based on the approximate-GCD problem of two integers which is a simplified version of the approximate-GCD problem of full integers in the DGHV scheme. The security of the scheme in [24] is not proved yet.
In this paper, a new public key compression scheme based on quadratic parameters with correction (QPC-PKC) is proposed. The proposed scheme reduces the public key size fromÕ(λ 5 ) toÕ(λ 3.5 ) by decreasing the number and bitlength of public key elements together. A somewhat fully homomorphic encryption (SWHE) scheme is presented based on the proposed QPC-PKC, and the parameter constraints are provided. The proposed scheme can obtain a smaller public key size compared to the existing schemes while remaining semantically secure. The correctness and semantic security of the proposed scheme are validated in this paper, and the efficiency of the scheme was analyzed and optimized. The new proposed QPC-PKC scheme is suitable for the secure application in mobile and remote cloud computing.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the notations and briefly introduces the QF-PKC and C-PKC schemes. Section III describes the proposed QPC-PKC scheme and the design and parameter constrains of the SWHE scheme base on the QPC-PKC. The correctness and semantical security of the QPC-PKC SWHE scheme are proved and presented in section IV. Empirical studies and data analyses are described in section V. Finally, the conclusions are presented in section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. NOTATIONS AND DEFINITIONS
For a real number z, the rounding of z up, down and to the nearest integer are set as z , z and z [14] , respectively. These operations are conducted on the (z, z + 1] , (z − 1, z] and (z − 1/2, z + 1/2] semi-closed intervals. For a real number z and an integer p,q p (z) and r p (z) represent the quotient and remainder of z divided by p. q p (z) def = z/p and r p (z)
Given the security parameter λ, the following parameters are defined. γ is the bit-length of the subgroup public key elements x i,j , η is the bit-length of the secret key p, and ρ is the bit-length of the noise r i,b used for generating the subgroup public key elements x i,j . τ is the number of public key elements, 2β is the number of the subgroup public key elements, while β = √ τ . α is the bit-length of the noise b i,j used for encryption to increase the randomness of the public key. ρ is the bit-length of the noise r used for encryption.
B. THE QF-PKC SCHEME
A quadratic form, rather than a traditional linear form, is proposed to generate the public key in the QF-PKC scheme [14] . The QF-PKC can reduce the number of stored elements (the subgroup public key elements) from τ to 2 √ τ integers by dividing the original public key element into two subgroup public key elements. VOLUME 5, 2017 In the DGHV scheme [13] , the ciphertext is expressed as:
Here, m is the plaintext and c is the ciphertext, S is the selected group of x i . The QF-PKC scheme changes the public key generation process. A new parameter β is defined as β = √ τ . The public key elements can then be expressed as x i,j = x i,0 · x j,1 , where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ β. By compressing the public key into the quadratic form, the number of stored integers x i,b can be reduced to 2β. Because 2β = 2 √ τ , the integers x i,j can be recovered from 2 √ τ subgroup key elements.
The ciphertext can then be rewritten as:
The QF-PKC scheme is semantically secure based on the error-free approximate GCD assumption, which is extremely difficult to be solved. The definition of the approximate GCD assumption is defined as
. For a random η-bits integer p and a non-square random 2 λ -rough integer q 0 , q 0 ∈ 0,2 γ /p) , it is absolutely difficult to output p from those given samples that satisfy the definition of D ρ (p,q 0 ).
C. THE C-PKC SCHEME
The C-PKC scheme optimizes the public key construction of the DGHV scheme [15] . The structure of the DGHV scheme public key element is defined in equation (3), where q i ∈ 0, 2 γ p and r i ∈ (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ).
The main contribution of the C-PKC scheme is to construct the γ -bit public key element x i from the difference between a γ -bit random χ i and a short-length integer δ i . The former is called the public key auxiliary element, and the latter is called the correctional element.
The C-PKC scheme constructs the public key auxiliary elements and correctional elements. The former are generated by PRNG seeds se, while the latter are generated by the structure χ i p + ξ i · p − r i in which r i ← Z (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ) and ξ i ← Z 0,2 λ+η /p . The PRNG seeds se and the public key correctional elements δ i are called the subgroup public key elements. These elements are stored as public key generation parts. Thus, the C-PKC scheme can reduce the public key size of the DGHV scheme toÕ(λ 5 ).
III. THE PROPOSED QPC-PKC SCHEME
Here, a combined public key compression approach based on quadratic parameters with correction is presented that reduces the number of public key elements and the element bit-lengths together.
A. THE QPC-PKC SCHEME DESIGN
The proposed QPC-PKC scheme utilizes subgroup public keys, which convert the public key elements into smaller subgroup public key elements with specific structures. These subgroup public key elements are composed of the same basic algebraic structures as the public key elements. In addition, the public key elements can be recovered from these subgroup elements.
The proposed QPC-PKC scheme is based on the errorfree approximate GCD assumption. If the scheme modulus is set as x 0 = q 0 · p for two specific integers p and q 0 , the distribution of D γ ,ρ (p,q 0 ) is defined as:
The (ρ, η, γ ) error-free approximate GCD assumption is defined as follows. For a random η-bit integer p and a non-square random 2 λ -rough integer q 0 , q 0 ∈ 0,2 γ /p) and x 0 = q 0 · p. Using the samples from D γ ,ρ (p,q 0 ), it is difficult to output p in finite polynomial time. Therefore, q 0 must be a non-square random 2 λ -rough integer in 0,2 γ /p) , which minimizes the factor decomposition and prime transversal.
B. THE PROPOSED QPC-PKC SCHEME
The key elements of the proposed QPC-PKC scheme are presented as follows.
1) The τ public key elements are generated as x i,j = x i,0 · x j,1 , where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ β. Therefore, the public key elements are constructed from the quadratic elements x i,b (b=0, 1).
2) The γ -bit quadratic element x i,b is constructed from the difference between a γ -bit random χ i,b and a short-length integer δ i,b .
The next step in the QPC-PKC scheme is to design the public key auxiliary element χ i,b and the public key correctional element δ i,b .
1) The public key auxiliary element χ i,b is generated by the pseudo-random number generator f according to the seed se. To ensure that the ciphertext bit-length can be effectively limited by x 0 , χ i,b must be generated within [ 0,x 0 ) 2β . Thus, all of the quadratic elements x i,0 are less than x 0 .
2) The public key correctional element δ i,b is generated by χ i,b based on the structure χ i,b p + ξ i,b ·p−r i,b in which r i,b ← Z (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ) and ξ i,b ← Z 0,2 λ+η /p . This structure makes the public key element generation the same as that in the C-PKC scheme, so as to ensure the security of the public key generation.
The ciphertext c in the QPC-PKC scheme is then rewritten as equation (5) in which 
C. THE QPC-PKC SWHE SCHEME STRUCTURE
Combining the proposed QPC-PKC scheme with a somewhat homomorphic encryption mechanism, the QPC-PKC SWHE scheme is presented and shown in Fig. 1 . The QPC-PKC SWHE scheme includes four processing stages, which are described below.
The key generation stage of the QPC-PKC SWHE scheme includes four steps. a) A random, large and odd integer p of size η-bits is generated, where p ∈ [2 η−1 , 2 η ).
b) A random non-square 2 λ -rough integer q 0 is selected, where q 0 ∈ 0,2 γ /p) . Then, x 0 = q 0 · p. A 2 λ -rough integer is an integer with no prime factors less than 2 λ . c) A random seed se is used to initialize a pseudo-random number generator f and generate a set of integers
0,2 λ+η /p . The public key for encryption is then defined as pk = (se, x 0 , δ 1,0 , δ 1,1 , . . . δ β,0 , δ β,1 ), and the secret key sk = p.
2) QPC.Encrypt pk, m ∈ 0, 1
In the encryption stage, the plaintext is encrypted into ciphertext based on the public key and the secret key. f (se) is used to recover the public key auxiliary element sets χ i,0 , χ i,1 and to compute the quadratic public key elements based on x i,0 = χ i,0 − δ i,0 and x j,1 = χ i,1 − δ i,1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ β. Then, a random integer vector b = (b i,j ) 1≤i,j≤β ∈ [0, 2 α ) τ is selected, where τ = β 2 . A random integer r in (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ) is chosen as the encryption noise. Finally, the ciphertext c output is given as:
The ciphertext is evaluated via multiple operations in this stage. These operations are defined in a circuit structure. For a given circuit C with t input bits, the ciphertexts c 1 , . . . , c t will be processed as input. The ciphertexts are passed to the addition and multiplication gates of circuit C. Then, the homomorphic additions and multiplications are performed for the given ciphertext integers. The resulting integer c * is then returned.
In the decryption stage, m = (c * mod 2) ⊕ ( c * /p mod 2) is computed. Then, the decryption result m is given by:
⊕ ( c * /p mod 2) (7)
D. PARAMETER CONSTRAINTS
According to attacks on the approximate GCD problem in [25] , the brute force attack on the disturbance variables VOLUME 5, 2017 in [26] and the attack on the approximate GCD assumption in [27] , parameter constraints are needed, as listed below. 1) ρ = ω (log λ) can avoid the brute force attacks on the noise.
2) η ≥ ρ · λ log 2 λ evaluates the ''squashed decryption circuit'' during homomorphic operations.
3) γ = ω η 2 log λ avoids attacks on the approximate GCD problem. 4) α · β 2 ≥ γ + ω (log λ) satisfies the Leftover Hash Lemma.
5) ρ = α + 2ρ + ω (log λ) satisfies the quadratic noise parameter requirement.
IV. THE CORRECTNESS AND SECURITY OF THE QPC-PKC SWHE SCHEME A. CORRECTNESS PROOF

Definition 2 (Homomorphic Decryption
pk, C, c)) = C (m 1 , . . . , m t ), then the homomorphic scheme E is correct for the circuit C.
Definition 3 (Permitted Circuit):
The permitted circuit is the general term for a series of circuits C ε in which the homomorphic scheme E is correct. In the QPC-PKC SWHE scheme, the permitted circuit must meet the following requirements: for any i ≥ 1 and any integer set less than τ i · 2 i(ρ +2) , the output value of the augmented circuit is less than or equal to 2 i(η−3−n) , where n = log 2 (λ + 1) . Here, C ε represents the collection of permitted circuits.
Lemma 4: The QPC-PKC SWHE scheme is correct for C ε . Proof: Given that the output ciphertext c = m + 2r + 1≤i,j≤β b i,j · x i,0 · x j,1 mod x 0 is generated by the QC.Encrypt (pk, m). For all 1 ≤ i ≤ β and b ∈ {0, 1},
Then, it is possible to get the ciphertext as According to the parameter constraint of ρ = α + 2ρ + ω (log λ), the absolute value of [c] p is provided as:
Assume that C is a permitted circuit with t inputs. C is the corresponding circuit operation for the given integers. Therefore, c i ← Encrypt (pk,m i ) is set. According to equation (11) and the definition of the permitted circuit, the following can be generated:
Thus, C (c 1 mod p, . . . , c t mod p) mod p = C (c 1 mod p, . . . , c t mod p) and equation (11) can be rewritten as: c mod p = C (c 1 mod p, . . . , c t mod p)
Therefore,
[c] p 2 = C c 1 mod p 2 , . . . , c t mod p 2 2 . (14) Hence, [c] p 2 = C (m 1 , . . . , m t ) is obtained. The circuit operation function used to process the ciphertext can also be used to process the plaintext m i . Thus, the correctness of the QPC-PKC SWHE scheme is proved.
B. SECURITY PROOF
The security of the proposed QPC-PKC SWHE scheme is based on a stronger approximate GCD problem, i.e., the error-free approximate GCD assumption of full integers [13] . The following theorems are needed to prove the QPC-PKC SWHE scheme security.
Theorem 5: Given attacker A, polynomials exist with parameters (ρ, ρ , η, γ , τ = β 2 ) based on the security parameter λ in the QPC-PKC SWHE scheme. If A possesses an advantage over the scheme, an algorithm B exists that can solve the (ρ, η, γ ) error-free approximate GCD problem with a probability of at least ε/2. The running time of algorithm B is expressed as the polynomial of λ, 1/ε and the running time of attacker A.
Theorem 6: In the random oracle model, the QPC-PKC SWHE scheme is semantically secure based on the error-free approximate GCD assumption of full integers.
1) THE SEMANTIC SECURITY
If attack occurs, a public key is generated by QPC.KeyGen, while the ciphertext is produced by QPC.Encrypt. If attacker A uses them as inputs, it can output the correct plaintext with a probability of at least 1/2 + ε. Here, the results of attacker A are used to construct a solver (algorithm) B for the (ρ, η, γ ) error-free approximate GCD problem. The construction and operation of solver B are shown below.
Step 1 (Public Key Generation): The solver B constructs a public key for the QPC-PKC SWHE scheme. Based on the distribution D γ ,ρ (p,q 0 ) definition in equation (4), the solver B can obtain D γ ,ρ (p,q 0 ) = {x = q · p + r : q ← 0,2 γ /p) , r ← Z (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ). Then, the following steps are processed.
1) x 0 = q 0 · p, where q 0 is a random non-square 2 λ -rough integer in 0,2 γ /p) . 3) The public key sequence produced by B is pk = (se, x 0 , δ 0,0 , δ 0,1 . . . , δ β,0 , δ β,1 ) , which is identical to the public key distribution generated by QPC.KeyGen in the QPC-PKC SWHE scheme.
The generation methods guarantee that x 0 is an odd integer, and x 0 is the largest one of the public key elements x i,b . Therefore, this public key element x 0 can be directly input into Solver B.
Step 2 (A High-Accuracy Least Significant Bit (LSB) Predictor Sub-Routine): Solver B produces a series of integers and attempts to find the quotient LSBs of the integer remainders p and to recover p from A. The high-accuracy LSB predictor sub-routine is presented as follows.
LSB(z, pk): Input: z ∈ [ 0,2 γ ) while r p (z) < 2 ρ , and a public key pk = (se,x 0 , δ 1,0 , δ 1,1 . . . , δ β,0 , δ β,1 ). Output: the LSB of q p (z). 
If the prediction is successful and attacker A obtains the correct plaintext corresponding to c k , i.e.,
When A is successful, b k will represent the LSB prediction of q p (z). Thus, the LSB predictor sub-routine will output the LSB of q p (z) with absolute probability.
Step
(Computation of the Binary GCD and p Recovery):
The LSB prediction of q p (z) can be produced from the LSB (z, pk) sub-routine, i.e., p can be recovered. A simple binary GCD recovery algorithm was proposed in [13] . Based on this algorithm and by constructing a binary GCD algorithm GCD(z 1 , z 2 ) similar to that in [28] , the odd part of gcd(q p (z 1 ) , q p (z 2 )) is obtained for any integers z 1 and z 2 that satisfy z i = p · q p (z i ) + r p (z i ), where r p (z i ) p. Thus, solver B is able to recover p with a reliable prediction of q p (z). Therefore, if A can break the QPC-PKC SWHE scheme with a probability of E, then B can use the structure of A to break the (ρ, η, γ ) error-free approximate GCD assumption in polynomial time. As described in [13] , if an attacker can break the error-free approximate GCD assumption, it is also able to break the approximate GCD assumption. However, the approximate GCD assumption currently remains unbreakable in polynomial time. Thus, the QPC-PKC SWHE scheme presented in the paper is semantically secure.
Therefore, based on the security of the approximate GCD assumption, the proposed QPC-PKC scheme has good performance against the attacks such as brute-forcing the remainder attack, continued fraction attack, Nguyen and Stern's orthogonal lattice attack, et al.
2) THE SUCCESS PROBABILITY OF ALGORITHM B AND THE COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY
If an attacker A on the ciphertexts encrypted by pk has an advantage of ε , then it will have an advantage of at least ε/2 for the corresponding private key p ∈ [2 η−2 , 2 η ), while all the private keys together constitute a collection P. Moreover, A will have an advantage of at least ε/4 for the public key pk, while these public keys together constitute a collection PK P .
Assuming that the approximate success probability of algorithm B to generate a distribution similar to the practical public key is at least 1/2, where is used to denote a negligible variable, algorithm B will generate the public key pk ∈ PK P with a probability of ε ≥ ε 4 − . In addition, algorithm B can generate the ciphertext, which has a similar distribution as the actual ciphertext, based on ε .
Algorithm B can generate public keys and ciphertexts that approximate the actual values. Attacker A can then produce the correct plaintext predictions with a probability of ε 4 − . The sub-routine will possess a time cost of poly(λ)/ε and obtain the correct LSB prediction of q p (z) 2 from the largest bit (0 or 1) in the b k with an absolute probability. Then, it processes the subsequent step and recovers p by calculating B.
If the private key p ∈ P, then B is able to recover p in an operation cycle with a probability of no less than 1 2 · ( ε 4 − ). The probability could be extremely high if B is run (8/ε) · ω ( log λ) times. Thus, inference algorithms with poly λ, 1 ε complexities exist for every private key p ∈ P, and the total success probability of attacker A will be at least equal to the density of P, which is ε/2. Therefore, Theorem 5 is proved and the correctness of Theorem 6 is also validated.
V. EMPIRICAL STUDIES AND DATA ANALYSIS
This section analyzes the performance of the proposed QPC-PKC scheme based on the constraint parameters from section III.D. The advantages of the proposed QPC-PKC scheme to reduce the public key size and the processing time are analyzed and compared with the existing FHE public key compression schemes. The proposed QPC-PKC SWHE scheme based on the FHE code packages (https://github.com/coron/fhe) is implemented. The public key performances are analyzed and compared based on four security parameter scale levels.
A. SECURITY PARAMETERS
Gentry defined the size of security parameters λ and divided it into four scale levels of security [13] . The four security parameter scale levels shown in Table 1 are chosen. The security parameter scale levels are equivalent to those in the QF-PKC and C-PKC schemes.
The purpose of the security parameters is to allow an optimal attack to run for at least 2 λ clock cycles on a standard computer and meet the parameter constraints defined in section III.D. Thus, these parameter values could be set as:
B. OPTIMIZATION ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED QPC-PKC SCHEME 1) OPTIMIZATION
Compared to the QF-PKC scheme, the major optimization advantage of the proposed QPC-PKC scheme is the replacement of the public key elements with public key correctional elements. Instead of storing the entire public key x i , only the subgroups of the public key are stored, which are calculated in the size of δ i . Thus, the public key element size is reduced.
Compared to the C-PKC scheme, the proposed QPC-PKC scheme optimizes the number of public key elements. The original τ = β 2 elements in x i are converted to 2β (2 √ τ ) elements, which reduces the numbers of δ i and χ i to 2β.
2) PUBLIC KEY SIZE REDUCTION
According to the parameters introduced in the previous sections, the subgroup public key element sizes are determined and theoretically compared. The collection of the subgroup public key elements is denoted as pk.
1) The collection of the subgroup public key elements in the proposed QPC-PKC scheme is pk = (se, δ 1,0 , δ 1,1 , . . . , δ β,0 , δ β,1 ), where 1 ≤ i ≤ β and b ∈ {0, 1}. The size of the subgroup public key elements is 2) The collection of the public key elements in the DGHV scheme is pk = (x 1 , . . . , x τ ) . The size of the public key elements (no subgroup) is:
3) The collection of the subgroup public key elements in the QF-PKC scheme is pk = (x 1,0 , x 1,1 , . . . , x β,0 , x β,1 ), where 1 ≤ i ≤ β and b ∈ {0, 1}. The size of the subgroup public key elements is:
4) The collection of the subgroup public key elements in the C-PKC scheme is pk = (se, δ 1 , . . . , δ τ ). The size of the subgroup public key elements is:
The size levels of the subgroup public key elements from the above four schemes are shown in Table 2 . As expected, the proposed QPC-PKC scheme can significantly reduce the public key size, which helps the FHE scheme to be practically applied.
C. EXPERIMENTS AND ANALYSIS
The proposed QPC-PKC SWHE scheme is implemented in this section based on the FHE code packages in [14] and the Sage 4.7.2 algebra libraries (http://www.sagemath.org/).
1) PUBLIC KEY SIZE
Specific parameters are presented based on the existing attack analyses and four security scale levels introduced in the previous sections. Tables 3 -6 contain the experimental results of the QF-PKC, C-PKC and the proposed QPC-PKC schemes for tiny, small, medium and large scale security parameters, respectively. Here, we also do the experiment when the security parameter λ = 82, the results are shown in Table 7 .
According to the results in Tables 3 -6 , the proposed QPC-PKC scheme significantly improves the public key size compression ratio. Although the security parameters display only small differences, the public key element sizes have been substantially reduced. Based on the large security parameter, the public key element size in the QPC-PKC scheme is only 135.7 KB, which is 2.3% of the public key element size in the C-PKC scheme and 0.017% of that used by the QF-PKC scheme. In Table 7 , when λ = 82, the public key size result of the QPC-PKC scheme is also smaller than those of the QF-PKC scheme and C-PKC scheme. 2) RUNNING TIME PERFORMANCE Tables 8 -11 present the running time of the key generation, encryption and decryption stages for the QF-PKC, C-PKC and QPC-PKC schemes based on tiny, small, medium and large scale security parameters, while Table 12 presents the running time of the three schemes when λ = 82. This experiment uses Sage 4.5.3 and GMP4.3.2 libraries [14] , and the three schemes are run on an Inter Core2 Duo E8500 desktop computer with a 3.12 GHz CPU.
According to Tables 8 -12 , the running time of the key generation module in the QPC-PKC SWHE scheme is larger compared with that of the C-PKC SWHE scheme because of the additional generation time of prime q 0 . However, the running time of the encryption module in the QPC-PKC SWHE scheme is decreased compared to the running time of the counterpart module in the C-PKC SWHE scheme. Thus, the proposed QPC-PKC SWHE scheme achieves a higher practical efficiency in operation than the C-PKC scheme. However, the decryption module results show no significant difference among the three schemes.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a new public key compression scheme based on quadratic parameters with correction is presented. It uses a quadratic form to reduce the number of subgroup public key elements and a random correction technique to decrease the subgroup public key element sizes. The design of the proposed QPC-PKC scheme is presented, and a somewhat homomorphic encryption based on the QPC-PKC scheme is constructed. The correctness and semantic security of the proposed scheme have been validated. Compared with existing public key compression schemes, the proposed QPC-PKC scheme theoretically reduces the public key size fromÕ(λ 5 ) toÕ(λ 3.5 ). For example, the QPC-PKC scheme reduced the public key element bit-length to 135.7 KB during the large security parameter (λ = 72) experiment, representing a significant reduction compared to the QF-PKC and C-PKC schemes. Moreover, the efficiency of the QPC-PKC SWHE scheme is superior to the efficiencies of those SWHE schemes based on the C-PKC scheme, especially in the encryption stage. MING LIM was the Head of the Centre for Supply Chain Improvement, University of Derby, building a new Centre of Excellence for supply chain and logistics for the region and beyond. In 2016, he joined Coventry University as a Professor of supply chain and operations management and cluster lead-supply chain sustainability and strategy within the Centre for Business in Society. He is leading a group of supply chain academics in building research profile and pursuing appliedresearch impact through industry collaboration. He has a long list of industrial project partners, including Toyota, Rolls-Royce, Bombardier, Unilever, Alliance Boots, DHL, the HNS, Tesco Express and Caterpillar, and a range of SMEs across different industries. He has excellent experience in supply chain management research with extensive expertise in multi-partner projects funded by EPSRC, Innovate U.K., EU FP7, and individual companies.
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